Welcome to The Four-Eyed Raven

I use this blog for my reflections on law, morality, politics, and anything else that inspires me to write. These are my personal reflections, and they do not reflect the views of my employer or my clients.

Game of Thrones 6×03: Oathbreaker

Warning: Spoilers are coming

I’m not a “books are always better” purist, but I’ve started to have some doubts about Season 6 of Game of Thrones now that the showrunners are operating without source material. In lieu of posting any spoilers on social media, here are my thoughts in blog post form. Please join the conversation in the comments!

First, 50 minutes? Really? That’s 10 whole minutes of extra time you’re just leaving on the table, when there’s so much story to tell.

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King v. Burwell: Big government for big government’s sake?

Of the many things that bother me about the King case – and there are many – one of the more disturbing ones is the idea that Congress so badly wanted to make the states establish insurance exchanges that it was willing to impose draconian punishments that would undermine the effectiveness of the law. Or, as Professor Lederman says at Balkinization:

Congress was so intent on inducing the States to set up Exchanges that it was willing to sacrifice the ACA’s signature reform—increased access to affordable health care—in those States that elect not to do so.

I think this is a symptom of a broader problem. When I listen to critics of the Obama administration, I get the feeling that there’s this underlying assumption that his agenda is to make government bigger and more powerful. Fixing the economy? Giving people access to health care? Preventing another financial crisis? These are all side effects of his real agenda: increasing the size and power of the federal government.

In this view of the world, the twisted reasoning of King makes sense. In passing the “Affordable Care Act,” Democrats’ top priority was not giving people health care; the top priority was telling states what to do, and “health care” was just a façade to make that happen. In that world, it makes sense to design a federal exchange that is set up to fail. But that’s not the world in which we live.

Lawyers Should Not Be Allowed to Write Letters

Apparently, Katy Perry’s lawyers have sent a cease-and-desist letter to a website that was making “Left Shark” statutes. I got the full text of the letter through abovethelaw.com, and I realized it shows everything that’s wrong with lawyers. I analyze the letter below:

Shapeways HQ
419 Park Avenue South
Suite 900
New York, NY 10016
www.shapeways.com

Dear Sirs:

Of course, BigLaw partners assume that people who runbusinesses are all “sirs.” I’m not sure “Sirs or Madams” would be any better. How about, “Dear Shapeways”?

We represent Katy Perry, the owner of the intellectual property depicted or embodied in connection with the shark images and costumes portrayed and used in Katy Perry’s Super Bowl 2015 halftime performance (“IP”).

What does Katy Perry own? Apparently, it’s “the intellectual property depicted or embodied in connection with the shark images and costumes portrayed and used” in her halftime performance. One could also say that she owns “the copyright on the shark costumes from” her halftime performance and not sound like you’re suffering from logorrhea.

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This Week in Reproductive “Rights”

There was a victory for reproductive rights in Texas two weeks ago when a federal judge blocked the Texas law requiring abortion clinics to meet the standards of ambulatory surgical centers. The ruling also reinstated a block on the admitting-privileges requirement for clinics in El Paso and McAllen. The state has appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which will be hearing arguments today. An interesting fact I learned from the AP article in the previous link: more than three-quarters of Texas’s actual outpatient surgical centers don’t meet the standards for outpatient surgical centers. It turns out these centers can be grandfathered in, but abortion providers cannot be.
Meanwhile, Missouri legislators overrode the governor’s veto to enact a 72-hour waiting period for obtaining an abortion after her initial consultation. The law takes effect next month.

On the subject of waiting periods, here’s a story from Pennsylvania that outrages me on multiple levels: Jennifer Ann Whalen, the single mother of a 16-year-old daughter who became pregnant and wanted to end her pregnancy. The family has no health insurance. Moreover, they lived in a rural town in central Pennsylvania, 74 miles from the nearest abortion provider. With Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting period (and, I’m assuming, Ms. Whalen’s work schedule as a nursing home aide), it was not feasible for her daughter to obtain a legal abortion. So, Ms. Whalen ordered medical-abortion drugs online and gave them to her daughter. When her daughter experienced severe cramping and bleeding, she took her to the hospital for treatment. Ms. Whalen was then arrested for violating a law against non-physicians performing abortions. Last week, she was sentenced to 12 to 18 months in prison. Who, exactly, benefits from this?

The Unrepresentative House

The New York Times had a piece this weekend entitled “Why Democrats Can’t Win the House.” Here’s the gist of the problem it identifies:

In 2012, Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives won roughly 51% of votes cast for a House candidate from one of the two major political parties. Nonetheless, the 113th Congress has 234 Republicans in the House — 54% of the seats.

How did this happen? While partisan gerrymandering undoubtedly plays a role, the Times piece argues that the problem is one of geography. Democratic victories, which are concentrated in major population centers, are by much wider margins than Republican victories.

Between these factors and the incumbency advantage, the Times piece says that only 29 House seats are truly competitive this fall. So, despite the lofty ideal that we can overthrow the government every two years, this is really not true in practice. In last week’s Slate Gabfest, David Plotz called this a national disgrace.

My question, which is narrower, is this: Is the non-representative nature of the House a bad thing?

If the goal of the House is to be as representative as possible of the American people, then yes, it’s a bad thing. Right now, representatives elected by a minority of the American people are in charge of one of the two Houses of Congress, and this has had enormous policy consequences.

But pure numerical representation is not the goal of our system of government. Just think about the Senate, the Electoral College, and the Supreme Court. There is an argument to be made that a non-representative House actually preserves the institution of self-government.

Aristotle explained over 2300 years ago that popular government could come in both a good form and a bad form. At some point, popular self-government crosses the line to become tyranny of the majority. The American notion of democracy incorporates this inherent conflict: we have an ideal of democracy, but we also have an ideal that a majority may not unfairly target or subordinate a minority. The difficulty, of course, is identifying when and how this occurs.

In the case of the House, could it be considered a good thing that the electoral calculus is weighted against the party that puts together the bigger majorities in its winning districts? Is there virtue in having a House that represents a more diverse set of interests, rather than just the interests of the majority?

Case to Watch: Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey

The case to watch this weekend is Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, the challenge to House Bill 2, Texas’s new anti-abortion law. The law goes into effect Monday, and it requires (among other things) that facilities providing abortions meet the standards of ambulatory surgical centers. According to the plaintiffs, the law would require all but six clinics in Texas to close. Six. A trial was held before U.S. District Judge Lee Yeakel earlier this month, and the parties expect a ruling before Monday.

In March, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld (Planned Parenthood v. Abbott) two other provisions of House Bill 2: its requirement that abortion providers have admitting privileges at local hospitals as well as the requirement that medical abortions be administered so as to comply with the FDA’s (out-of-date and not medically indicated) authorized protocol.

This is the latest in the saga of states using these tactics to restrict access to abortion. According to the Guttmacher Insitute, 26 states require facilities where abortion services are provided to meet ambulatory surgical center standards. Fifteen states have some version of an admitting-privileges requirement. Seventeen states have regulations that apply to sites where medical abortion is provided, even if surgical abortion is not.

Judge Yeakel is going to have to deal with some tricky precedent in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth’s Circuit Abbott opinion — written by the notoriously conservative Judge Edith Jones — takes a very narrow view of what constitutes an “undue burden” on the right to have an abortion. But last month, a different Fifth Circuit panel blocked Mississippi’s admitting-privileges requirement (Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier) on the grounds that it would cause the last abortion clinic in Mississippi to close and that “Mississippi may not shift its obligation to respect the established constitutional rights of its citizens to  another state.” This issue is likely to come up in Whole Woman’s Health as well. For example, if House Bill 2 goes into effect, women in El Paso will have to travel 550 miles to the nearest Texas abortion provider; Texas’s government justifies this by saying that the nearest clinic to El Paso is only 15 miles away — in New Mexico.

Whatever the ruling this weekend in Whole Woman’s Health, the matter is likely to be appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where that court will once again have to address the determined efforts of abortion opponents to chip away at women’s rights.

Hobby Lobby: Because Science

I think my biggest problem with Hobby Lobby is summed up by this passage from Justice Alito’s opinion: “The owners of the businesses have religious objections to abortion, and according to their religious beliefs the four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients. If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating abortions.”

The only contraceptive methods at issue in this case were Plan B, Ella (the newer morning-after pill), and two types of IUDs. The best scientific evidence available indicates that emergency contraceptive pills operate by preventing ovulation and that IUDs operate by preventing either ovulation or fertilization. The FDA labels, however, indicate that they “may” operate to prevent implantation of a fertilized egg — mostly because (1) Americans are very sensitive about abortion and (2) that’s the sort of claim that is hard to definitively rule out. (From what I understand, the evidence is less clear regarding the mechanism of action when IUDs are used as emergency contraception, but that is a very, very rare use of IUDs.) But, probably to streamline the case and get a quicker resolution, and because it would be hard for the US to credibly argue that the Court should ignore the FDA’s labeling, the US didn’t really make this factual argument in the case.

The Farce of Originalism

One Q&A that received some amount of attention this week was this exchange between Justice Scalia and Ted Olson in the Perry oral argument:

JUSTICE SCALIA: I’m curious, … when did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted? …

MR. OLSON: [M]ay I answer this in the form of a rhetorical question? When did it become unconstitutional to prohibit interracial marriages? When did it become unconstitutional to assign children to separate schools?

JUSTICE SCALIA: It’s an easy question, I think, for that one. At … the time that the Equal Protection Clause was adopted [in 1868]. That’s absolutely true. But don’t give me a question to my question. When do you think it became unconstitutional? Has it always been unconstitutional? . . .

MR. OLSON: It was constitutional when we as a culture determined that sexual orientation is a characteristic of individuals that they cannot control, and that that—

JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. When did that happen? When did that happen?

MR. OLSON: There’s no specific date in time. This is an evolutionary cycle.

This whole exchange is somewhat farcical, but it requires a little explanation.

Justice Scalia’s view is that the Constitution never changes unless it is explicitly amended. So, segregation became unconstitutional in 1868 with the ratification of the 14th Amendment, but people and judges were just too ignorant to realize it until 1954. In my opinion, this in general is a pretty silly way of looking at constitutional rights. It seems pretty intuitive (to me, at least, and also to Ted Olson) that as culture, society, and technology changes, the content of constitutional rights can change as well.

But the legal absurdity of Justice Scalia’s line of questioning is really shown by the 1954 case Bolling v. Sharpe.

Bolling was decided on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, and it said that it was unconstitutional for the District of Columbia to have segregated schools. This may seem obvious. Why should Washington be able to segregate its schools if Topeka can’t? But constitutionally these are separate questions.

The text of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: “No State shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Kansas can’t segregate its schools, but Washington, DC isn’t a state, so the 14th Amendment doesn’t apply. However, the Supreme Court figured out a work-around. Relying on the convoluted doctrine of substantive due process, the Court held that the 5th Amendment’s requirement that the federal government provide “due process of law” effectively guarantees equal protection of the laws. (In legal lingo, this is called “reverse incorporation.”)

In reality, Justice Scalia can’t defend Bolling, because he doesn’t believe in the doctrine of substantive due process, which he calls an “oxymoron.” So, we have two choices. If Justice Scalia wants to be perfectly consistent, he has to say that Bolling was wrong and that the federal government can discriminate against minorities all it wants. But, if he believes Bolling was a correct decision, his originalism would require him to say that it was always unconstitutional for the federal government to discriminate based on race, because the 14th Amendment did not affect the federal government. Thus, until the Civil War, the federal government could have constitutionally enforced slavery but not school segregation.

I realize that Justice Scalia has his own ways of getting around these problems, “acquiescing” in the recognition of long-recognized rights. But it shows that Justice Scalia’s oral argument questioning is, in some ways, little more than a legal parlor trick.

The Marriage Equality Cases

To be perfectly honest, I haven’t read or watched most of the commentary around this week’s arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry (the Prop 8 case) or US v. Windsor (the DOMA case). I find that prognostication based on oral argument is pretty pointless. The Justices, going into this week’s arguments, have read hundreds upon hundreds of pages of briefing materials about the cases. Oral argument, by its very nature, frequently addresses the more obscure issues that haven’t received the bulk of the briefing. And, oral argument at the Supreme Court has become more and more about grandstanding by the Justices (see, e.g., Scalia, Antonin).

That being said, here’s the basic run-down of what you need to know, as we wait three months for the decisions.

1. Standing: The Court could, in theory, refuse to decide either case. Like so many controversial cases, both Perry and Windsor have questions of standing—whether there’s a real “case or controversy” that gives the Court jurisdiction. In Perry, the State of California declined to defend Prop 8, allowing the official proponents of the law to take the defense in the case. The question is whether the proponents of Prop 8, having lost, have the right to appeal the decision. After all, they didn’t lose; it was theoretically the State that lost. Similarly, in Windsor, the Obama administration declined to defend DOMA. The defense has been led instead by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (really, the House Republicans). In both cases, if the Court finds no standing, the plaintiff wins—Prop 8 falls and Edith Windsor gets her tax refund—but the cases have no precedential value.

(In Windsor, things actually get weird if there’s no standing. Since there would be no valid appellate court ruling on DOMA, the law would stand, but Windsor as an individual would nonetheless get her tax refund. Individual plaintiffs would have to keep suing until somebody loses, at which point that losing plaintiff would have standing to appeal.)

2. Level of Scrutiny: Laws that discriminate against a particular group must meet one of the following three tests:

  • Strict Scrutiny: The law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
  • Intermediate Scrutiny The law must significantly further an important government interest.
  • Rational Basis Review: The law must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

Which test is used depends on the characteristic that is being subject to discrimination. “Suspect” characteristics—race, religion, and national origin—get strict scrutiny. Quasi-suspect characteristics—primarily gender—get intermediate scrutiny. Everything else gets rational basis review.

The Supreme Court has never said which category sexual orientation falls into. Based on the factors used by the Court in the past, sexual orientation must be at least quasi-suspect, and probably a suspect class. But the Court has always avoided making a definitive ruling on this question. If the Court finds that the laws fail all three tests, then they can keep avoiding the question. But if the laws are at least rational and legitimate, then they have to make a decision.

3. Equal Protection Analysis: Once the level of scrutiny is determined, the core question is how much “bite” the relevant test has. For example, Judge Walker, in Perry, found that Prop 8 was an irrational means to an illegitimate end, and would thus fail even under rational basis review. If the Court applies either intermediate or strict scrutiny, it will be almost impossible to uphold either law. If it applies rational basis review, the question is really whether Justice Kennedy (or perhaps Chief Justice Roberts) will nonetheless vote to strike them down as irrational.

4. Romer v. Evans: The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Perry managed to strike down Prop 8 while purporting not to affect laws in any other states. It did this by relying on the 1996 case Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado ballot initiative that made it unconstitutional to enact legal protections for gay individuals. The Court ruled in Romer that the ballot initiative could not have had any basis other than irrational prejudice, and it therefore was unconstitutional. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Perry that “Proposition 8’s only effect was to take away that important and legally significant designation, while leaving in place all of its incidents.” Taking away “marriage” while leaving in place all of the rights of civil unions could not have been motivated by nothing other than irrational prejudice.

However, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling proves too much. If there can be no rational reason to take away “marriage” from same-sex couples while leaving civil unions in place, how can there be any rational reason to give same-sex couples all of the rights of marriage except the name? Even if there were valid, legitimate reasons to restrict marriage rights to heterosexual couples, once you give those rights to same-sex couples, you have admitted that there’s no reason not to give them the title “marriage” as well. This leads us to…

4. The “Eight-State Solution”: The United States has actually argued for an interesting middle-ground resolution in Perry, which commentators are calling the “eight-state solution.” Even if sexual orientation is not a suspect class, and even if discriminating against same-sex couples can be rationally defended, then it is nonetheless irrational to give them all the rights of married couples and not the title “marriage.”  It’s pretty much the definition of “separate but equal.” Accordingly, the eight states that have full civil union laws—California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island—could not ban same-sex marriage. None of the Justices appeared to bite down too hard on this argument at oral argument, but it remains the most plausible way to strike down Prop 8 while not affecting the laws of the 32 states than same-sex marriage.

5. States’ Rights: One of the weird arguments to pop up this week was whether definition of marriage is, in effect, a state right. Justice Kennedy in particular seemed to be arguing that states alone have always had the power to define, grant, and dissolve marriage. Thus, Californians can legitimately restrict the institution to male-female couples (i.e. Prop 8 stands), but the Federal Government must accept whatever definitions the states use (i.e. DOMA falls). If your state considers you “married,” you should be able to file a joint federal tax return.

Normally, I would consider this to be a highly unlikely scenario. The Supreme Court rejected once and for all the idea that states have any “traditional” functions immune from federal intrusion almost 30 years ago. (Yes, it was that recent.) I would be shocked if they walked back on that jurisprudence now. But, we are living in strange times. In June, the Supreme Court stated that the ACA’s individual mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, and it held that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was unduly coercive on the states. Neither of these positions was supported by any rational reading of the existing case law. But, one of the perks of being on the Supreme Court is that you can do pretty much whatever you want.

So, we’ll find out in June.